Blocking API calls for security by Truckenmiller, James Douglas
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations 
1-1-2002 
Blocking API calls for security 
James Douglas Truckenmiller 
Iowa State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd 
Recommended Citation 
Truckenmiller, James Douglas, "Blocking API calls for security" (2002). Retrospective Theses and 
Dissertations. 21336. 
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/21336 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and 
Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses 
and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, 
please contact digirep@iastate.edu. 
Blocking API calls for security 
by 
James Douglas Truckenmiller 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Major: Computer Engineering 
Program of Study Committee: 
Doug Jacobson, Major Professor 
James Davis 
Daniel Norris 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2002 
Copyright© James Douglas Truckenrniller, 2002. All rights reserved. 
11 
Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
1bis is to certify that the master's thesis of 
James Douglas Truckenmiller 
has met the thesis requirements of Iowa State University 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy \, 
111 
ABSTRACT 
The typical user feels comfortable with just having anti-virus software running on their 
computers. This solution works well if viruses are known and the virus databases are updated 
frequently. The virus writing community has responded by writing software that mutates the 
viruses so that these viruses are undetectable to the anti-virus software. Attackers know that anti-
virus solutions rely on signatures and if the attacker mutates the virus, the virus will not be 
detected. Virus writers mutate their product by using software called packers, compressors, and 
binders. Take an older virus, pass it through one of these mutating programs and now the attacker 
has a new variant of the old virus that will pass through anti-virus software. A simple example of 
this type of problem in anti-virus software is the MiniZip worm. A packer called NeoLite was 
used to create the MiniZip worm, which was a compressed version of the ExploreZip worm. This 
new variant of the ExploreZip worm spread rapidly even though the virus was well known. This 
new variant went completely undetected from the existing anti-virus software. 
In response to these new threats, a more proactive strategy to counter malicious code must 
be developed. This thesis focuses on using proactive monitoring techniques to identify code that 
has malicious intent and to block these operations. To achieve this, the thesis explores digital 
DNA, system resource monitoring and API monitoring. API monitoring was selected as the 
method of choice for determining malicious intent. This work discusses different API monitoring 
technologies, to include: proxy DLL, patching, and binary rewriting. With binary rewriting 
technology, the author was able to develop a software solution to counter malicious code. As a 
proof of concept, the author will demonstrate his security product monitoring, and block the one 
of the most costly viruses to date, the "I love you Virus." 
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Chapter 1. BACKGROUND 
Malicious code has plagued the computer industry for as long as computers have existed. 
Great steps have been made in closing systems and adding security to products, but writers of 
malicious code have found new and innovative ways to exploit operating systems. The 
information assurance community has answered with various types of anti-virus software. This 
solution works well if viruses are known and the virus database is updated frequently. The virus 
writing community has responded by writing software that transforms the viruses so that they are 
undetectable to the virus software. 
This thesis proposes to show the inadequacies of anti-virus software, supporting the need 
for a new model to create an additional layer of defense to guard against malicious code. For 
purposes covered by this thesis, malicious code is defined as the following three major threats: 
viruses, Trojan horses and worms. 
Definitions 
To outline a definition for each of these threats, a virus, not termed as a technical exploit, 
simply attacks the user's action. As a user executes an attachment containing a virus, it launches a 
pre-programmed sequence of events to attach and infect the user's system. A worm is defined by 
the propagation of a piece of code across networks. It usually does not attach itself to other 
programs, but rather is a technical fault in the operating system. An example of this is "Code 
Red", which exploited a buffer overflow in Microsoft's web server, enabling it to maliciously attack 
other systems. This required no user intervention. As long as a system was running a web server, 
it was vulnerable. Trojans are defined by a piece of code that on the outside performs expected 
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operations, while at the same time is executing additional malicious actions against one system. 
Software of this nature typically installs a backdoor into the user's system, leaving it open to 
further manipulation by the attacker. Although there are many more types of malicious code, I 
will focus on these three. 
Anti-Virus Problems 
Anti-virus is not infallible. It cannot protect against a computer virus that is new to the 
security scene. It is intuitive that if the virus signature is not in the database, the virus scanner will 
not detect it and its malicious code could slip through the cracks of anti-virus protection. Virus 
writers have also been able to sneak known viruses through anti-virus protection. Attackers know 
that anti-virus solutions rely on signatures and if the attacker mutates the virus, the virus will not 
be detected. Virus writers mutate their viruses by using software called packers, compressors, and 
binders. Take an older virus, pass it through one of these mutating programs and now the attacker 
has a new variant of the old virus that will pass through anti-virus software. One would think that 
anti-virus companies would obtain viruses and then use these mutating programs to create 
signatures for all possible forms of the virus. It is unfeasible for anti-virus companies to put all 
possible signatures into a database because the combinations are endless. Vincent Weafer, Director 
for Symantec Anti-Virus Research said, "If anti-virus programs included computer code to read 
every type of file compression software, the scanning programs would be huge and incredibly 
slow. The anti-virus companies worry that this would frustrate users and cause them to disable the 
program." A simple example of these types of problems in anti-virus software is the MiniZip 
worm. A packer called NeoLite was used to create the MiniZip worm, which is a compressed 
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version of the ExploreZip worm. This new variant of the ExploreZip worm spread rapidly and 
went completely undetected from anti-virus software. 
Another problem posed to the writers of anti-virus software is the increased propagation 
speed of new viruses. In earlier times, anti-virus companies could detect a virus, spend a couple of 
days disassembling it, release a patch and consider their users protected. In today's times, 
however, viruses spread in hours leaving anti-virus companies no time to release a patch before 
their customers get infected. Mike Hill, a former Dr Solomon's executive, now an independent 
technology marketing consultant said, "The fundamental problem is that anti-virus software is 
reactive. We have a situation now where a virus could have done 80 percent of its damage before 
a fix has been written - we're shutting the stable door after the horse has bolted." 
Beyond Anti-Virus 
Now that we have seen the failures of anti-virus software, proactive security companies 
have taken additional steps to secure their clients' computer systems. These companies have 
implemented strategies to analyze code in an attempt to determine if the software is malicious. 
These methods do not use virus definitions, instead relying on the fact that viruses perform 
uncommon system operations to achieve their malicious intent. 
If one could define and monitor these events in the operating system, then it would be 
possible for a piece of security software to stop malicious code that is new to the scene and 
therefore previously undefined. 
This is a proactive solution. No longer does a computer need to have a window of 
vulnerability lying between the time the malicious code is released and the point at which the anti-
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virus software develops an update. Foundations for this proactive system might include: Digital 
DNA, system resources, and system calls. 
Digital DNA is a relatively new idea. It is the belief that most new viruses inherit source 
code from older viruses. If one could capture the DNA of the old viruses, it may be possible to 
scan for new viruses using old DNA In this way, a software package could identify unknown 
viruses. The procedure is analogous to the testing of DNA in humans. In much the same way, 
human offspring can be identified as related to his or her parents through DNA matching. This is 
a promising technology and there is little doubt that it will be thoroughly investigated in the future. 
Unfortunately, the mechanics of digital DNA are extremely complex. A solution of this 
magnitude would require substantial investigation, and therefore is ill suited to exploration in this 
thesis. 
System Resources are metrics on a system that allow the user to determine allocations of a 
computer's resources. Malicious code needs computer resources to spread, infect, and run. The 
system can monitor these resources with precision to determine if malicious code is running in the 
background. They can also employ past metrics as a baseline to test if the machine is using an 
inordinate amount of resources, which would indicate a possible virus infection. 
This method has proven to be unreliable in determining virus activity. A cleverly written 
virus would not fluctuate a system's resources, but instead demand only a veiy small amount. 
Some malicious code writers have refined code to the point that it is nearly impossible to detect 
with this method. It is true, however, that some viruses are noisy to the system and can still be 
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detected with this method. This method was not chosen based on the fact that the author feels 
this method is too easily beaten and not accurate to the extent demanded by this thesis. 
The final method investigated uses API calls to differentiate the intent in code. This 
method differentiates constructive from detrimental code by peering into parameters sent to the 
application protocol interface. This is the method chosen for this thesis and the author believes it 
to be superior to all other methods discussed. Since this method was chosen to be the building 
block of a new security program, its pros and cons will be discussed later in this thesis 
Through additional research, it was discovered that many companies implement these 
strategies; however, not one software product free to the public was available. There are software 
packages from companies like Network Associates and Finjan available for large sums of money, 
which protect consumer systems from unknown threats. Not only are these software packages 
expensive, the companies themselves are unwilling to discuss in detail their technical solutions for 
proactive code analyzation. This lack of free software justifies the need to further investigate 
avenues to bring this technology to the public for free. 
Thesis Goals 
This thesis is centered around the creation of a security program that attempts to spy on 
Application Protocol Interface (API) calls to search out malicious intent. As stated above, analyses 
of parameters that are passed to the API, coupled with pattern matching would safeguard against 
new malicious code attacks. Although this is a proactive solution in this arena, it is by no means 
the ultimate solution. It is simply an additional safeguard that attackers must circumvent. This 
security project raises the expertise needed by a code writer to create malicious code that actually 
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does damage. However, with more layers added to the security model, the more expensive 
security becomes for the consumer. There is also the increased probability that false positives are 
introduced into the model. 
The proactive security program will focus on analyzing code downloaded by the user. This 
downloaded code could be an email attachment as well as an executable. Java and active X 
technologies are not supported. Downloaded code was chosen because it represents a major 
problem for the typical user. Many of the fastest spreading and destructive viruses were spread 
through email as attachments. This security program attempts to plug this hole and allow users to 
open attachments in a safe environment. 
The security program will be written for the Microsoft Windows XP environment. This 
was chosen because at the time of writing this thesis, Windows XP is the latest operating system 
from Microsoft. This will give the security program at least a two-year life, coinciding with 
Microsoft's projected release of another operating system. The security program will be developed 
in Microsoft's Visual Studio .Net environment. It was the author's desire to uses the latest 
development platform as well as operating system for this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. CAPTURING THE DA TA 
Formal Definition 
Figure 1 shows that a mobile code C, can be downloaded or migrated to H 1• On 
c 
Hi 
Figure 1. A Simple Model (adapted from Pandey 1998) 
H 1, C transforms at runtime to P exe· P exe is linked to H 1 system resources R1, R2 and R3 by 
H 1 operating system or more specifically its linker. The operating system then creates an 
environment for P exe to execute in. This is the standard access model which most security 
products are based on. Security with this model is designed to enforce access control from P exe to 
the resources R1 through R3• This picture is simple but incomplete for this thesis. Figure 2 shows 
a more complete picture. This model introduces a layer between the resources and P exe' which is 
labeled 11• For this thesis, 11 is defined as the amalgamation of the user API, native API, and 
system kernel. The interiors of the 11 layer will be important to the reader, and will be presented in 
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chapter 6. With these layers defined one can now define the exact nature of this thesis. A security 
program must place user-defined limits on P exe from accessing R1, R2, and R3 through interface 11• 
c 
Hi 
Figure 2. An Expanded Model 
From this abstraction, common names will be placed on these formal definitions so that it 
is specific to the Windows environment. P exe will be referred to as the application, downloaded 
code and executable. The resources will be called files, registry, and input and output operations. 
11 will be referred to as the Win32 APL Now that the definitions are in place, a look at the 
technologies available for intercepting API calls is examined. 
Monitoring Techniques for API 
The following is a list of monitoring (spying) techniques. It is a list of known methods to 
wedge a monitoring program between the application and the operating system resources. The 
pros and cons of each technique will be explored. 
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ProxyDLL 
The first and by far the simplest way to spy on an application is to create a proxy Dll 
(Kaplin, 2000). This proxy Dll must reside in the same directory as the application upon which 
one wishes to spy. The proxy Dll is to be made up of code stubs that call the real Dll that the 
application will import functions from. When a user double clicks, or executes a program, 
Wmdows uses two functions internally to load and execute the application. LoadModule is used 
for 16 bit applications whereas Createprocess is used for 32 bit applications. The executed 
application relies on functions exported by Windows Dils. Since one requires the operating 
system to call the proxy Dll before the Windows Dll, the search path of these loading 
functions must first be determined. 
Both of these functions will use a predefined search path. First, the loader will look in the 
directory in which the executable resides. If the loader does not fmd its desired Dll, it then looks 
to the current directory of the calling process. From there, the loader looks at the system directory 
to locate the specified Dll. By first looking at the executable directory, the proxy Dll is initiated 
instead of the system Dll. For example, if our goal was to monitor the wininet.dll which has API 
calls to access services like http, ftp and other related functions, we would create a proxy Dll 
called wininet.dll and write stubs to call the wininet.dll that resides in the system32 directory. This 
method is transparent to the executable running (Kaplin, 2000). 
Application 
Application 










One might wonder if Windows will function properly if there are two D LLs with the same 
name in the same memory space. The answer is yes. Windows will function correctly, as it uses 
the full system path to identify the DLL. To simplify this, as long as the DLLs are in different 
directories they can have the same name. 
The downside to this method is two fold. The first problem is that most DLLs export 
hundreds of functions. It would be very tedious to create stubs for all of them (Kaplin, 2000). 
The second and more pressing problem lies in the fact that Microsoft has many undocumented 
functions. As the programmer does not know the formal definition of these functions, it becomes 
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very difficult for him or her to write stubs to these functions. If these undocwnented functions 
are not included in the proxy Dll, then this method loses the transparency to the executable, 
which is unacceptable. For example, the calculator function of Microsoft Wmdows might use 
undocwnented functions. If the security program is used to monitor the calculator's system calls, 
the security program will inhibit the calculator's ability to run. Even if the calculator contained no 
malicious code, its program would terminate. 
Patching 
Another technique for API spying is patching. To understand patching, an explanation of 
the Wmdows 32 portable execution file format is in order. 
PE 
Portable execution (PE) is a standard way for executable files to be organized. The format 
is portable because it does not depend on the processor being used in the system. A PE file can 
be run on a MIPS, Alpha, or an Intel processor as long as a Microsoft operating system is used. 
The most prudent sections of the PE file are the import section and the .text and .idata sections. 
Here is a look at the PE: 
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IMAGE_NT_ 
Off set 0 
Figure 4. PE Header (adapted from Pietrek, 1994) 
As a program executes a call to a DLL, it does not directly jump to the dynamically linked 
library. The execution flow is instead transferred through an indirect function in the .idata section. 
In assembly language, it appears as follows: 
]MP DWORD PTR [xxxxxxxx] 
The reason for this transfer was speculated by Mark Pietrek in the 1994 MSD N Library. 
This .idata section DWORD contains the real address of the operating system 
function entry point. After thinking about this for a while, I came to understand why DLL 
calls are implemented this way. By funneling all calls to a given DLL function through one 
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location, the loader doesn't need to patch eveiy instruction that calls a Dll. All the PE 
loader has to do is put the correct address of the target function into the DWORD in the 
.idata section. No call instructions need to be patched ..... If the segment calls a given 
DLL function 20 times, the loader must write the address of that function 20 times into 
the segment (Pietrick, 1994). 
Having the loader change the address 20 times would slow down the loading process. As 
Microsoft wants their applications to load quickly, they have implemented a single spot for 
changing the address of API calls. 
Since the import address table is a writable, one would let the loader assign this area with 
the correct function address, save it, and then redirect it to point to a spying function. In these 
functions one would then point to the address copied from the import address table after it is 
modified This would make hijacking of the import address table transparent to the executable. 
This is one of the most common ways to intercept API calls (Pietrick, 1994). It is efficient because 
all that is needed is a change to the import table. The downfall of this method is that the code of 
the program can dynamically call a DLL without going through the import table. Examples of this 
are the following API calls: 
Loadlibraiy - can be used to load a new Dll that is not in the import table 
GetProcAddress - Loads a function address given a name of the function 
Code Rewriting 
Detours Library 
The Microsoft research team has scrutinized the process of capturing and extending the 
functionality of Windows systems calls. They put together the detours libraiy, which has an 
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extensive amount of functions to be used to facilitate API spying. This package is the starting 
point for the research code introduced by this thesis. It seemed well documented and contained a 
plethora of examples to aid in familiarization of this package. The detours package uses binaiy 
rewriting technology to facilitate its needs. It is superior to other aforementioned technologies 
(Hunt, 1999). 
Binaiy rewriting in not done to the program on the disk, but it is applied dynamically at 
runtime. Detours looks for function calls in the binaiy file and replaces the first five bytes with an 
absolute jump. This jump points to a detours function in which a programmer can insert custom 
code. After the custom code is run, control is then transferred to a trampoline function. This 
trampoline function holds the original code from the function that was detoured. The detour 
libraries allow one to completely replace a function with one of their own without calling the 
original. Applying the principles of this security program, one can ultimately place monitoring 
code in the detours function and then call the trampoline function to make the spying completely 
transparent. Figure 5 is an illustration of what was just described. 
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Invocation without interception: 
Source 
Function 






Figure 5. Binary Rewriting (adopted from Hunt and Brubacher, 1999) 
Figure 6., adapted from the detours literature, shows the process at the assembly language 
level. As illustrated in figure 6, the target function is replaced with a jump to a detour function. 
The detour function can call the trampoline function that restores control to the application being 
monitored. 
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push ebp , jmp DetourFunction 
mov ebp,esp 
push ebx 
push esi TargetFunction+S: 
push edi push edi 
... . .. 
Trampoline .. Trampoline I I I I ... . .. 
TrampolineFunction: TrampolineFunction: 
jmp TargetFunction push ebp 





Figure 6. Detours Binary Rewriting (adapted from Hunt and Brubacher, 1999) 
One problem with this type of implementation is that a disassembler is needed to properly 
calculate the instructions to copy. It is necessaiy to know how many bytes to copy as well as the 
boundaries of the function calls. Writing a dissasembler is not a trivial task. It would be possible 
to implement this rewriting strategy; however, the hours necessaiy to construct this type of 
program would be in the hundreds. The decision was made not to reinvent the wheel, and the 
author used the detours libraiy. The time that would have been spent on writing a binaiy rewriting 
platform was instead applied to extending the functionality of the detours libraiy. 
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Detours Effeiency 
The detours libraiy is efficient. In the literature distributed with the detours libraiy, it is 
compared to other techniques explored within this thesis. As illustrated in figure 7, the detours 
libraiy has very little overhead with an empty function call. For instance, on a call to 
CoCreatelnstance, which creates one object on the local system, the detours libraiy performed 
respectably when placed against its competitors. Breakpoint trapping was not discussed in this 
thesis as a viable option for API interception because of its slow performance of Microsoft's 
debugging system. 
Interception Intercepted Function Empty CoCreate-Technique Function Instance 
Direct O.l 13µs 14.836µs 
Call Replacement 0.143µs 15.193µs 
DLL Redirection 0.143µs 15.193µs 
Detours Library 0.145µs 15.194µs 
Breakpoint Trap 229.564µs 265.851µs 
Figure 7. Detours Compared (adapted from Hunt and Brubacher, 1999} 
The author has noticed degradation in performance when a large number of APis are 
monitored with detours. This situation becomes extremely slow when one outputs the API used 
and the program crashes. Figure 7 shows a table of the times measured by the authors on the 
calculator program that comes with Wmdows XP. As one can see, monitoring every API really 
reduces the transparency of the detours libraiy. 
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Run Time 
Calc.exe 150 milliseconds 
Calc.exe Full Monitoring 2357 milliseconds 
Calc.exe Full Output Crashed repeatedly 
Figure 8. Timing Degradation 
Running in Process 
The API spying code must be in the process of the binary that one would want to 
monitor. There are multiple ways of achieving this: 
1. Change this registry- key to include the DLL that one wants: 
• HKEY LOCAL MAa-IINE\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVers - -
ion\ Windows \Applnit_ Dils 
2. Create a device driver and inject it when CreateProcess is called 
3. Modify the PE header to add a DLL with custom code 
The third method was chosen. This method modifies the PE header to add a custom 
DLL. Option two was discarded because the author has little knowledge of the workings of a 
device driver. Option one, which was to change the registry- key, will not work for all programs 
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that can be run. Changing the registry key links any DLL to the user32.dll. User32.dll is a core 
DLL upon which Windows programmers heavily rely. 
Most Windows graphical programs include user32.dll. Unfortunately most of the DOS 
programs do not. Option one is the easiest to implement, however it would make this project less 
effective as it excludes DOS based programs. The detours library has functions to write into the 
PE header. These were used to change the header to incorporate a new DLL into the process's 
memory. 
The PE header can be changed either dynamically or statically. As far as testing has gone, 
it was discovered that there was no benefit in performing it dynamically or statically. The author 
continued to use dynamic method to change the PE header. 
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Chapter 3. VIRUS A TTR!BUTES 
In this chapter, an exploration into how viruses, Trojans, and worms work will be 
investigated. Analysis is needed to determine what system API calls should be stopped and what 
combination of API calls will be an indication of malicious code. Malicious code has some 
common threads, which will be explored in the following chapter. 
Escalating privileges 
Services 
The creators of malicious code often write their viruses to register themselves as services 
to Microsoft Windows. A service is automatically started when Microsoft Wmdows boots and is 
spawned from a privileged process. Since most spawned processes inherit the security descriptor 
from the parent process, services run in the privileged mode in Windows (Brown, 2000). This 
privileged mode has the full rights of the operating system. Malicious code loves this kind of 
access. Anything that is running in system level context will not be registered to the user. The 
user cannot see the process running. To put this in another way, the user cannot press the alt-
control-delete combination to see this program. 
Local buffer Overflows 
Buffer overflows are often used to escalate privileges. An attacker would want to overflow 
a privileged process to escalate his or her reduced privileges to that of the overflowed program. 
This is difficult to stop. Any one of the API functions could contain a buffer overflow problem. 
One would need to monitor every API call and develop a string-scanning algorithm to identify the 
buffer overflow attempt. The author believes that intercepting every single API call could put too 
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much strain on the system. As the author has witnessed, the system usually crashes when 
monitoring a large number of API calls. 
Enumeration 
Rogue code often checks to see if other programs, such as anti-virus, are running. These 
viruses also use the enumeration of processes to figure out to which running processes to attach 
themselves. The API call is EnumProcessesO and can be called from a legitimate program 
checking to see if a previous version of the software is running. 
Registry 
The system registty is an important arena in which to stop malicious code. Many known 
viruses and Trojans like to hide in the registry and for good reason. The registry is a vast 
repository of information that is crucial to Microsoft products. It contains the majority of all the 
state information for the operating system. Stopping registry manipulation is one of the main 
goals of this thesis. An obvious problem arises; one cannot completely shut down the registry 
because normal programs will need access to this information. The solution is to block the most 
commonly attacked keys. A normal program would not normally access these keys, but malicious 
programs frequently do. I have attempted to identify specific keys that are favorites to malicious 
code writers in an endeavor to impede the infecting process. 
How the Registry Works 
Microsoft implemented a registry file with the introduction of Wmdows 95. The need for 
a storage house of state information was brought on by the fact that previous to Windows 95, 
information was stored in an .ini file. These files were simple text files and afforded little or no 
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security. With the implementation of a registry, security was added so that state information was 
not as easily accessible. 
The registry has a tree like structure and is similar to the directory structure that is 
common to file systems. There are four main trees, HKEY _LOCAL_ MAGilNE, 
HKEY _CLASSES_ ROOT, HKEY _USERS, and HKEY _ ClJRRENT _USER These are always 
open according to the Microsoft Platform SDK and can be accessed with calls through the API. 
This paper will now introduce keys and sub-keys, which can be quite confusing. A key is a 
directory structure that holds sub-keys. Sub-keys contain important state information for a 
program. Here is an example: 
Key = SOFIW ARE\Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \Run Once 
Sub-Key =BearShare 
The sub-key BearShare, which is actually a program that starts up on the author's 
computer, has a data type of REG SZ and has the data of 
D:\PROGRA-1\BEARSH-1\BEARSH-1.EXE Im. This key allows the program BearShare 
to start when a computer boots up. The above example shows a key that will be monitored by this 
security program. 
Writing Files 
Files are more complicated than registry access. There are legitimate reasons why 
programs would want to overwrite a file in the Windows system directory. A downloaded 
program might need to overwrite an old DLL file that resides in the Windows system area. The 
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user should know what kind of file has been downloaded and should have a reasonable 
expectation of what directories are going to change from these downloaded files. 
Watching file usage is an important aspect of identifying malicious code activity. A 
program can be categorized based upon the type of files that it writes. An example would be a 
program that iterates through all the folders and subfolders on a hard drive. Veiy few programs 
need to iterate through the entire directoty structure. Only backup programs or special programs 
like disk defragmenters need this type of access. 
Files and Directories Viruses like to Change 
What follows is a list of commonly edited files and directories that are attacked by 
malicious code: 
System.ini - could change the shell equals line to boot a program 
Wminet.ini- Wmdows uses this file to install and uninstall programs on reboot 
Autoexec.bat -As mentioned before, this file can be used to start programs up automaticallywhen 
the system boots 
Config.sys - Malicious code can change this file to start up software drivers 
Wm.ini - Contains load and run lines that could be used to start malicious code as well as a shell 
line that is vulnerable to attack. 
These directories are commonly attacked: 
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System root - The system root directmy is a favorite location for many programs to hide. Usually 
malicious code will write to this directory and give the new file a clever name so that a user doesn't 
suspect trouble. 
Root directory - This is where autoexec. bat and config.sys as well as some critical startup files like 
boot.ini are stored 
System temp directory - Not as critical as the other directories listed here but still the author would 
like to warn the user of access to this directory 
Recycle bin - Virus writers figured that the user would not notice new files in the recycle bin and 
thus it is another favorite of malicious code writers 
Startup folders - Places where code is automatically executed when Wmdows starts up. 
Email Access 
Most malicious code implementations are spread by email. Most of the malicious code 
that accesses emails uses MAPI to interface with the Outlook client to read the contact list. It is 
the hackers' belief that their code has a better chance of propagating if the virus is sent out 
through trusted users. This belief exploits a trust relationship. A virus writer can fmd these trust 
relationships in the contact list in outlook. The user will have the option of blocking MAPI calls 
to outlook. 
Internet Access 
Microsoft has many different ways of accessing the network. This is the most difficult 
attribute to stop due to the magnitude of ways to access the network through the API. This 
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security program makes no attempt to stop access either to or from the internet. The author 
believes that this is an important operation to stop; however, the complication of doing so was 
overwhehning. 
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Chapter 4. IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter covers the implementation of the security program. In the previous chapter, 
malicious code attributes were explained. This chapter discusses the actual API calls that will be 
used to block malicious code. After the API calls are discussed, a brief explanation on how the 
security program works is presented to the reader. The following diagram illustrates what the 
security program's front end looks like. 
E.ile fiegistry Options f:::lapi ~andboxing E.ile Options 
The executable to Run 
P: \WIND DWS \ system32\wscript. exe I Ix C: \need\ james. vbs 
D II to attach to E xecuatable 







Figure 9. The Front End 
I 312712002 I 12:30 PM ISCRL 
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Now let's look at the actual API call monitored. 
Registry API Calls 
Table 1. Monitored API Calls 
Name Description 
ReqQueryV alueExA By far the most important call, 
this function allows a program to get a 
system handle to a specific key 
RegOpenKeyA Open the sub key which is 
under the specific key open with 
ReqQueryV alueExA 
RegSetV alueExA Sets the type of the data as well 
as the data in a sub key 
RegEnum ValueA Enumerate through sub keys in 
akey 
RegOpenKeyExA Opens the key 
Now that the API calls have been specified, one must determine what access to the 
registry is allowed and what is denied. The following is a list of keys that have been added to a text 
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file. These keys are placed on the restricted list because they are favorites for malicious code 
writers and most ordinary programs do not access these keys. 
NeverShowExt - This key is used to never show an extension. This feature can be used to 
trick users into running something they didn't intend to. There is no need for a legitimate program 
to change this key. 
The run keys - There are a couple of sub keys that allow programs to automatically execute 
when the operating system starts up (Chirillo, 2001). Most programs do no write to these keys but 
a couple of thern, like file sharing programs, do. 
Here are the run locations that are monitored: 
• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \R.unSer 
VIces 
• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \Run On 
ce 
• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \R.unOn 
ceEx 
• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \Run 
• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Microsoft\ WindowsNT\CurrentVersion \Wm 
logon 
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• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \Run 
• Hkey _Classes_ Root \exefile \shell\open \command 
Here is a list of keys that viruses change so that they can launch when a user executes an 
.exe file: 
• Hkey _Classes_ Root \exefile \shell\open \command\ 
• Hkey _Local_ Machine \Software \Classes \exefile \shell\open \command 
There are many more keys that users might want to block. It is very possible that a user 
might want to add the registry keys that control file associations. These keys are another 
probable area of attack. This security program reads in from a user defined text file containing 
keys that one wishes to block. These keys are then sent through a named pipe to the security 
DLL. Remember, this DLL is in the process of the software one wishes to monitor. For the 
security program to run, the user must select a text file with registry keys as show in the 
illustration. 
Iii. Proactive ·•. ~ • 
J File Registry Options Mapi Sandboxing File Options 
Select Executable ... 
Select dll ... 
Select Registry Keys 
Exit ._,..._ ........................... ""' 
D II to attach to E xecuatable 
r·ln .... nlnn nll 
ript. exe I Ix C: \need\iames. vbs 
Figure 10. Selecting the Registry File 
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File System Calls 
Now that the registry has been covered one can tum attention to file management. This 
security program must concentrate on the files accessed as well as the files being created or 
deleted. What follows is a list of specific API functions that will be monitored. 
File API Calls 
Table 2. Windows File Ap llication Protocol Interface 
Name Description 
OpenFile Function used to create, open, 
reopen, or delete a file. 
MoveFileExW Wide and ANSI definitions of 
MoveFileExA 
move file. Attacker could attempt to 
move a file into a directory to subvert 
MoveFileA 
this security program. 
MoveFileW 
WriteFile The WriteFile function writes 
data to a file and is designed for both 
synchronous and asynchronous 
operation. 










Function to copy an eXl.Stlilg 
file or a directoiy, including its children, 
to a new directoiy. 
Function retrieves attributes for 
a specified file or directoiy, also used to 
walk through a directoty 
Creates a new directoty with 
security descriptors. 
Deletes a file from the system. 
Creates a new file on the 
system. 
The user has an option with this security program to use sandboxing. Sandboxing restricts 
all of these API calls to two directories. The first directoty is the working directoty that is user 
supplied. The second directoty is built into the DLL. This directoty is the Windows system 
directoiy. In addition to sandboxing, the user also has the option of disabling all file creation and 
deletion. The option to stop file creation and deletion occurs in the working directoiy as well as 
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the system directmy. With these three options enabled, the piece of code that is being monitored 
by the security program should be unable to write, read, or delete a file. 
""·Proactive <Yif 
Eile B.egistry Options f::'.l.api J :?_andboxing Eile Options 
~1ra1 1 .f!l JI, 1 ~ 1 ~1m&m1•••r------------
no 
The executable to Run 
p: \WINDOWS \system32\wscript. exe //x C: \need\ james. vbs 
D II to attach to E xecuatable 




Figure 11. Menu Options 
Overview of the Security Program 
The operation of the security program is quite simple. The user selects options in the 
menu bar to determine how tightly to restrict the program to be monitored. The user then selects 
the executable that he or she wishes to run. If the executable selected has a .vbs extension, the 
security program changes the executable line to facilitate the script file. Then the user selects the 
DLL that will be attached to the executable. This DLL is usually no.dll but for expansion 
purposes this option was added to allow other D LLs to be used. The file with the registty keys is 
then selected. The user is now ready to execute the program. The front end of the program sends 
all this configuration data as well as the security keys over to the DLL that is running in the 
specified program. The DLL will report back to the front end when any blocked action occurs. 
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The status bar at the bottom of the program tells one the current state. When the executable that 
is being monitored is done, the DLL is unloaded and the security program is ready to run another 
program. 
Difference between executables and scripts 
There is a difference between .exe files and scripts. An .exe file is a stand-alone executable 
file that has been compiled to executable code. It can be brought to many different windows 
machines and will run on all of them. This is the target of the security program outlined by this 
thesis. 
The security program injects itself by rewriting the PE header and loading the custom 
DLL. This method could not be applied to document files or scripts. These types of files might 
contain API calls but without a PE header to change, the author was unable to architect a way of 
loading a custom DLL to monitor for malicious code. However, other security products 
monitored not only executables as well as scripts, active X components, and java scripts. The 
author believes these programs used a simple method to monitor non-compiled code. One simply 
monitors the programs that run the scripts or word documents. The scripts, active X components 
and java code must be interpreted to machine language by an executable program. Using this 
knowledge, the author was able to test the security program with the "I Love You" virus, which is 
not an executable but a script. 
Technical Description 
In this section, the author will describe the technical problems that were solved in order to 
produce this security project. 
34 
Named Pipe 
One of the first problems was to decide if a graphical user interface was needed for this 
project. This program could have just encompassed the security DLL. One possible solution was 
to compile ten differently configured security DLLs. Each DLL would be unique, offering an 
array of protection to the user. For example, one DLL would have closed down file access where 
another would have limited the access to the registry. This idea was quite simple since the DLL 
would have been static. The user simply picked the right security DLL for the access he or she 
wanted the downloaded program to be run under. This idea was rejected by the author, however, 
as it did not allow the user to select all possible D LL combinations. The next possible solution 
explored was the idea of a user front end. In this solution, the user could select the exact options 
that he or she desired. Implementation of this solution presented a unique problem: How would 
the front end talk to the security DLL? The answer came in the form of a named pipe connection 
between the DLL and front end (Walnum, 2000). A named pipe works exactly how one would 
expect. If you put data in one end, it comes out the other. There were some initial timing 
difficulties including when to start the named pipe in the DLL, which were resolved by using the 
timeout features available in the programming language (Brain, 2001). 
Data Types 
Another constantly occurring problem was in the conversion of data types used by Visual 
Basic to those used by C++. Strings in Visual Basic contain headers as well as size information. 
Before information could be sent across the named pipe, the Visual Basic string must be converted 
to a form the C+ + could understand Additionally, the parameters passed to most of these 
functions are wide string definitions of the form LPCWSTR. These are used for Unicode support. 
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As the author chose to block Unicode as well as ASCII functions, the Unicode must be stripped 
down to a comparable version for processing. The author wrote some comparative functions to 
facilitate this. 
Threads 
At random times, the security DLL would send information to the front end of the 
security program. This information must be read from the front end and then displayed to the 
user. What was needed was a dual natured Visual Basic program capable of continually reading 
input and processing user information. Unfortunately, Visual Basic does not have the capability to 
write multithreaded applications. The solution presented itself in the form of the Visual Basic 
timer. Visual Basic has the capability to create a timer mechanism to execute code at regular 
intervals. If the intervals were too short, the program would lose responsiveness. Conversely, if 
the intervals were too long, the named pipe would overflow with data. 100 millisecond time 
intervals were chosen and seem to work well. Although a thread would have been the ideal 
solution, the timer is adequate. 
Determining API Calls 
There was an unexpected problem in determining the proper API calls. The author was 
under the impression that the MSDN documented Win32 API calls were correctly named and 
could be used in intercepting API calls with the detours library. The author struggled to intercept 
the first API call and a look at the detours documentation library did not provide guidance. The 
author tried to create a file using the MSDN library command to create a file: createfileO. Upon 
first inspection, the author believed this was the correct syntax to use for interception. It was not 
until the author carefully examined the system DLLs, however, that he found a reference to 
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Createfile W. With this as the function prototype for the detours library, the interception took 
place and he was able to intercept his first call. 
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Chapter 5. CASE STUDY, THE 'I LOVE YOU' 
VIRUS 
In this chapter, the new security program will be put to the test with the "I Love You" 
virus launched in May 2000. The "I Love You" Virus is an ideal case study and test model for the 
following reasons. First and foremost, the source code to the worm was available online, making 
testing more complete. With source code, the virus can be debugged line by line which provides 
the author with a clear view of the operations performed by the virus. Secondly, the "I Love 
You" virus is relatively simple with no more then 300 lines of code. Third, this virus was one of 
the most costly viruses written, which some have speculated to cost billions of dollars. Finally, this 
virus was not an executable but simply a script. This allowed testing of the new security program 
in a situation where a legitimate scripting host, which will extensively use API calls to facilitate 
itself as well as the virus, is running. The new security program must let the scripting host run 
even while the virus code tries to execute, or more simply, it must distinguish between good and 
bad code. The next section explains the background of the "I Love You" virus and then a report 
card will be presented to see how well the new security program performed. 
Background on 'I Love You' 
The "I Love You" virus is a Visual Basic script that will run on Microsoft Windows 
systems that the scripting host is enabled. The virus arrives as an email attachment. Once a user 
executes the attachment, the virus goes to work. The payload of the virus overwrites specific files 
on ones hard drive and then sends out an infected email to eveiyone in the outlook address book. 
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In Detail 
The virus begins by creating a copy of itself and storing it in a global variable. It then uses 
this global variable to make three files in the system, temp, and windows directories. Since this 
new security program has sandboxing technology, these writes are completely blocked. The "I 
Love You" virus is coded to continue on error, therefore the virus continues and tries to write to 
the registry. The "I Love You" virus follows the same pattern as many viruses. It attempts to add 
an entry into the 
HKEY LOCAL MA.a-IINE\Software \Microsoft\ Windows \Current Version \Run\ - -
MSKernel32 key. The value written executes the virus when Wmdows boots up. This key is in 
the list of blocked keys so this call also becomes intercepted and blocked. 
The virus continues with the modification of the Internet Explorer start page. It facilitates 
this by changing the registry entry for the start page. This action is also denied by the new security 
program when the option to block new keys is selected. The virus then enumerates through the 
directory structure scanning for files with a .vbs ending. If it fmds one of these files, it changes the 
script file to have a copy of the virus. This is also blocked if the script file resides outside the 
current directory. If the current folder contains scripts, however, these files will be infected by the 
virus. This action can also be stopped by not allowing file creation, which is an additional option 
on the menu bar. 
As the virus proceeds, it attempts to delete files with the .jpg or .jpeg extensions. All file 
deletions are blocked so this action fails. It then checks for .mpeg or .mp3 extensions and tries to 
create a new file with the same name as the music file. This new file contains a copy of the virus. 
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Once again, if these files are outside the directory structure in which the virus is running, this 
action will be blocked. Also if blocking file creation is enabled, the virus cannot create a file even 
in the running directory. 
The virus's next stage is to look for an IRC client. If one is found, the "I Love You" virus 
attempts to create a new script.ini in the IRC directory. This action will be blocked if it is outside 
the virus's working directory. 
Email is the next target for the "I Love You" virus. It attempts to access the infected 
user's outlook address book. This is facilitated through a function call to the MAPI services, 
which can be blocked by this security program. The virus receives no email addresses from this 
action and since it has no emails to send, it proceeds without sending infected emails to everyone 
in the outlook contact list. 
Report Card 
The new security program preformed admirably, stopping most, if not all the dangerous 
payload of this worm. No files were deleted. The virus does not start up with the booting of 
Windows and infected email was not sent. The only downfall of the new security program occurs 
when the virus is run in the same directory as music files, picture files and IRC files. This problem 
only occurs if one has not selected to block file create and file delete. 
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Chapter 6. POSSIBLE ATTACKS 
In this section, an exploration into defeating this proactive security program will be 
performed. Through further research, it has become evident that there are shortcomings and 
possible security holes to this type of program. For these shortcomings to be exploited, however, 
the malicious code writer would need knowledge of the inner workings of this security software. 
Three possible ways the security program could be bypassed are as follows: Native API, direct 
jumps, and self-modifying code. It is possible to implement solutions for each of these obstacles; 
however, they are not presented in this work. 
Native AP! 
The first and conceptually the most difficult to defeat is the native API. In figure 2, a 
model was given to aid the reader in conceptualization of this security program. Although an 
accurate representation of the big picture, taking a look at how Windows implements the native 




Figure 12. Improved Security Program Model 
The model now includes two levels of application interface. 11 will now be defined as the 
user API and I2 is the Native APL The OS Kernel is added to the picture and is the object that 
directs undocumented native API calls to undocumented executive calls. 
The Windows native API is vastly undocumented (Russinovich, 1998). Only a small 
amount of documentation can be found in the Windows Device Driver Kit. Even though 
Microsoft has not released documentation on these functions, programmers have figured how to 
use these functions with great accuracy. The native system APis reside in a file called Nt.dll. The 




System Service Table 
• 
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Figure 13. Execution of a Win32 API Call (adapted from Russinovich, 1998) 
The question arises as to why the author chose to intercept user API calls and not native 
API calls. The answer to this question is dictated by Microsoft's documentation. As described in 
the detours literature, one must know the exact function definitions to use binary rewriting 
technology to monitor the API (Hunt, 1998). Since Microsoft has not documented this layer, the 
author believes it would have been nearly impossible to implement the detours library in this level. 
The situation gets even more convoluted due to the fact that native applications exist that 
are not clients of the operating system. These native applications cannot be clients because they 
are used before the Windows 32 operating environment is initialized. The native applications 
bypass the user API and therefore would completely circumvent this security program. As of this 
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writing, the author is not aware of malicious code that is compiled in this manner. However, as 
proactive systems become more deployed, virus writers may tum to this method in order to bypass 
this type of security. 
A solution to the problems posed by native API calls is presented through static 
analyzation. It would be possible to look at the executable in memory and determine if it makes 
these types of calls. Once this determination is made, the decision would be up to the user 
whether or not to proceed with this type of code. 
Self-Modifying Code 
Another issue is presented by self-modifying code. Self-modifying code is code that is 
capable of writing to itself and modifying its original intent. The consequences of this ability seem 
intuitive. A security program could scan an executable for API calls. The security program would 
detect no API calls and thus believe the program to be benign in nature. The executable is then 
launched and deletes all files on the hard drive. Attacks of this type can easily occur, as seemingly 
benign programs are able to morph into dangerous pieces of software during execution. Although 
this security program doesn't protect from this, there are methods in stopping self-modifying code. 
On possible way is to make the code segment of the executable read-only, which can be achieved 
by virtual memory protection. 
Indirect Jumps 
There exists another possible way of sidestepping this security program. Indirect jumps 
can transfer control to a location in memory at run-time (Twyman, 1999). Virus writers could use 
indirect jumps to transfer execution to native API calls. These locations can be outside the 
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programs memory space. Static analyzation cannot be used to determine indirect jumps since they 
occur at run time. To combat this threat, software fault isolation (SFI) can be implemented on this 
executable. SFI uses binary rewriting technology to scan the executable and place run time checks 
on read, write, and jump operations. This is accomplished by using segment matching which 
compares the high bits of these jump addresses to the correct memory segment. If the high bits 
match, the jump is safe. Conversely, if the bits do not match, an exception handler is run 
(Twyman, 1999). 
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Chapter 7. CONCL US/ON 
The author considers this security program to be a success. Its purpose was to 
demonstrate that API monitoring could be used as an effective measure against malicious code. 
This was successfully demonstrated with the "I love you virus". 
Future Work 
There are some remaining issues that the author did not explore due to time restraints. 
There is a question of the effectiveness of the security program when the virus is encrypted. Since 
the detours library performs binary rewriting technology in memory, it may be possible that an 
executable could be constructed to evade this technology. The solution to this problem is to let 
the virus decrypt itself and then attach the D LL to the virus in order to block its access. This is 
done by writing a piece of software to first look for decoding loops and then to later attach the 
DLL. Decoding loops are well understood and there is software known to the security industry 
for detecting these types of loops. 
Another problem with this security program could occur if a virus was written to 
manipulate data without using the system APL This virus could be coded by writing very low-level 
assembly. Here is an example: A virus writer could write a low level piece of software to send out 
a packet on an Ethernet card without using Windows API calls. 
Finally, there is a problem with undocumented window calls. If a virus writer was to 
define an undocumented call to perform an action like file deletion, this program would not stop 
it. Also, there are many different ways of deleting a file without actually deleting it. Instead of 
calling the API call to delete a file, which would be blocked by my program, a malicious code 
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writer could open the file and modify it to contain zero bytes of data. Another example would be 
moving the file to the recycle bin and letting the user delete it accidentally. Microsoft has 
thousands of different APis. Understanding how they all come together is a difficult task. The 
author has no doubt that some API calls have been missed and these missed API calls could be 
dangerous to system integrity and should be blocked. Due to the fact that the author does not 
have complete understanding of Microsoft's API structure some calls slipped through the cracks 
of this security program. 
Further work on this project would have to examine these aforementioned problems. In 
addition, this program should be expanded to block internet access. This is a daunting task but the 
author believes that it can be done. Blocking internet backdoors would be extremely helpful with 
stopping Trojan horses. File manipulation also needs to be added to this project. Viruses love to 
attach to programs and imbed themselves into these files. API calls could be monitored to stop 
this type of aggression against a system. 
Final Thoughts 
This solution is not the end of malicious code attacks. Like any program of this nature, 
hackers could subvert this program. If an attacker knows prior to writing a virus the exact API 
calls monitored, the attacker will be able to subvert this security program. The author believes this 
is the exact reason technical documentation on how other proactive solutions were implemented 
could not be found. 
Overall, this program is simply another layer of security to be added into the security mix. 
It is the author's belief that the more layers added, the more difficult it will become for the 
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malicious code writers to prevail. This is another step to assist the information assurance 
community in completing their goal of a secure computer system. 
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